Publish and Perish: Creative Destruction and Macroeconomic Theory by Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Publish and Perish: Creative Destruction
and Macroeconomic Theory
Jean-Bernard Chatelain and Kirsten Ralf
Paris School of Economics, University Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne,
ESCE
13 February 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76825/
MPRA Paper No. 76825, posted 15 February 2017 16:36 UTC
Publish and Perish:
Creative Destruction and Macroeconomic
Theory
Jean-Bernard Chatelain Kirsten Ralfy
February 13, 2017
Abstract
Macroeconomic theories of the 1980s faced accelerated depreciation when not
sudden death. By contrast with econometrics and microeconomics and despite mas-
sive progress in access to data and the use of statistical softwares, macroeconomic
theory appears not to be a cumulative science so far. When attempts are done to
settle controversies by "nature" (testing the theories), they are designed to fail due
to Greshams law of selecting theories based on too many parameters, which are
weakly or non-identied when testing them. Two examples are provided, one in
growth theory and testing convergence, one in business cycles theory and testing
ination persistence.
JEL classication numbers: B22, B23, B41, C52, E31, O41, O47.
Keywords: Macroeconomic theory, controversies, identication, economic growth,
convergence, ination persistence.
Paris School of Economics, Université Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne, PjSE, 48 boulevard Jourdan,
75014 Paris. Email: jean-bernard.chatelain@univ-paris1.fr
yESCE International Business School, 10 rue Sextius Michel, 75015 Paris, Email: Kirsten.Ralf@esce.fr.
1
"Nothing is vanity; on to science, and forward!" cries the modern Ecclesiastes, that
is to say Everyone in the world. And yet, the cadavers of the bad and the lazy fall
on the hearts of others... Ah! quick, quick a bit, over there; beyond the night, these
future, eternal, rewards... do we escape them?..." Rimbaud A. (1873), A Season in Hell,
Lightning.
1 Introduction
Mainstream macroeconomic theories of the 80s (monetarism, real business cycles, xed-
price disequilibrium theory, ad hoc dynamic models not based on Ramsey (1928) optimal
saving) all faced creative destruction. They belong to the history of economic ideas. They
were replaced by the new-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
theory in the 2000s. Controversies on macroeconomic theory did not go away: "For more
than three decades, macroeconomics has gone backward" (Romer (2016), p.1). This paper
investigates why controversies are not settled in macroeconomic theory so far, despite
creative destruction.
Drakopoulos and Karayiannis (2004) and Duarte (2016) suggest to limit the call for
Kuhns scientic revolutions for explaining the creative destruction of paradigms. The
creative destruction of short-lived attempts to expand knowledge, with limited scope of
explanation and with fragile empirical validation, is not equivalent to a major scientic
revolution.
Duarte (2012) initially put forward Blanchards view that stylized facts "do not go
away" as key driver of the new-Keynesian DSGE modelscreative destruction of other
theories. After detailed investigation, Duarte (2015) is more balanced. Stylized facts on
business cycles remained controversial with trend versus cycle decomposition. Demand
shocks versus supply shocks did not lead to clear-cut results. Duarte acknowledges that
other factors than "facts" may explain the new-Keynesian DSGE theory takeover.
Juselius and Franchi (2007), Spanos (2009) and Poudyal and Spanos (2016) contrast
a "theory rst" or "pre-eminence of theory" approach (where facts do not go away, but
should adjust to the theory) such as new-Keynesian DSGE theory versus cointegrated or
Students t vector auto-regressive models (C-VAR) "data rst" approaches, where theory
has to change due to econometric results found using data. Juselius and Franchis (2007)
replication of Irelands (2004) real business cycle (RBC) model and Poudyal and Spanos
(2016) replication of Smets and Wouters (2007) show how a careful investigation of the
properties of time-series suggests to change the theory.
Colander (2009) asks why new-Keynesian DSGE theory is more successful as a theory-
rst approach than data-rst approach of cointegrated vector auto-regressive models (C-
VAR). He suggests that new-Keynesian DSGE theory may not require "judgment" and
may be more tted for natural selection in academic journals and the academic labor
market.
Latours (1988) approach suggests that long-lasting scientic controversies signal a
failure to accumulate knowledge in ready-made science. Macroeconomic theory appears
to be an extreme case, where data and facts seem to be unable to settle its controversies
so far, so that other factors decide on what could be the prevalent theory at a given point
in time (Colander (2009)).
Firstly, the object of study of macroeconomics is prone to controversy. Secondly,
macro-econometrics faces more di¢ culties than micro-econometrics, with a di¢ cult treat-
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ment of endogeneity and parameter identication issues. Thirdly, there is a complemen-
tary between these prevalence of controversy in macroeconomics and macro-econometrics
and the researchers incentives to preserve the theoretical "discipline" of their theory-
rst approach while deliberately forgetting discipline with respect to identication issues
when using econometrics. We relate Canova and Salas (2009), Blanchards (2016) and
Romers (2016) critique on identication issues of new-Keynesian DSGE models to Colan-
ders (2009) researchers incentives and career concern.
The theoretical discipline of micro-foundations is justied by the endogeneity of
macroeconomic policy instruments leading to parameter identication problems (Lucas
(1976)). Omitting the endogeneity of the policy instruments may lead to biased pa-
rameters of macroeconomic policy transmission equations. This endogeneity bias may
change if the policy rule parameters determining the endogeneity of the policy instru-
ments change. This mis-measurement of macroeconomic policy transmission mechanisms
may lead to policy mistakes.
But micro-foundations do not solve all identication and observational equivalence
issues when testing theory. Some micro-foundations correspond to misspecied models
which do not t the data at all. Some micro-foundations may imply too many structural
parameters with respect to reduced form parameters (under-identication) of the statis-
tical model supposed to test the theory. Scientic discipline is forgotten when using ad
hoc exogenous auto-regressive forcing variables in order to force the t of the "theory" to
the persistence of observed macroeconomic time-series. Alternative theories suggest that
these auto-correlation parameters are endogenous and depend on macroeconomic policy.
A macroeconomic theory-rst approach is likely to select non-identied and weakly-
identied ways of designing theories, of designing the way to test them and of selecting
the data. The evolutionary tness rule of successful theories attracts many allies among
researchers; it is based on a simple idea: Design "not even wrong" under-identied theories
with too many parameters for testing them. Controversies on parameters cannot be settled
when they are not (or weakly) identied. These theories allow multiple interpretations,
numerous variations and combinations in subsequent papers, controversies, citations and
fame. Ockhams razor of parsimony of the number of parameters of a theory is not
rewarding for academic careers. It removes too many opportunities of publications and
citations.
"The treatment of identication now is no more credible than in the early 1970s but
escapes challenge because it is so much more opaque." (Romer (2016), p.1). In new-
Keynesian DSGE models, equation are linearized with respect to variables, but they
include reduced form parameters which are non-linear functions of preferences and tech-
nology structural parameters. These technicalities have been handled in several papers
following Canova and Sala (2009). So far, they had no impact on changing the new-
Keynesian DSGE theory.
We present two examples of identication issues which can be easily understood by
undergraduate students in economics. The rst example deals with optimal growth the-
ory: testing the convergence hypothesis. The second example deals with business cycles
theory: testing the new-Keynesian theory of ination persistence.
Our plan is as follows. Firstly, we mention the accelerating depreciation of the macro-
economic theories prevailing 25 years ago. Secondly, when attempts are carried out to
settle macroeconomic controversies by "nature" (testing the theories), Greshams law se-
lects macroeconomic theories that are designed to be based on weakly or non-identied
parameters when testing them. Thirdly, two examples are provided, one in growth theory,
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one in business cycles theory.
2 Ex-Fan of 80s: The Accelerated Depreciation of
Macroeconomic Theories
2.1 Dead macroeconomic theories
It is the average fate of scientic papers to face a decay of citations. Two cases are in
order. Either the citationsdecay is related to the fact that a given area of knowledge
is now in ready-made cumulative science. Researchers decided to expand the variety of
knowledge elsewhere. Else, the citationsdecay is related to partial or complete creative
destruction of the knowledge brought by these papers. There is a graduation in order to
evaluate how a particular macroeconomic theory dies, although a few one may resurrect.
Besides citations decay, a number of indicators may measure the lack of interest of
theories: no use or mention in current research, no recent PhD thesis building on this
theory, no mention in current policy advice argument, no mention in current master level
textbooks, no mention in current undergraduate level textbooks, . . . and nally mostly
mentioned and cited by historians of economic thought.
We mention, in memoriam, four deceased mainstream macroeconomic theories of the
80s and a short obituary notice. In doubt, ask yourself. If a master student comes in
your o¢ ce and argues that he would like to do a PhD using the following 80s theories,
would you accept to be his PhD advisor?
1. Monetarism
Monetarism stressed the importance of policy rules for monetary aggregates in order
to ght ination, based on an old economic idea: the quantitative theory of money, with
already an impressive literature emerging in the 50s. It was American-based with a
prominent Chicago Nobel prize winner with political clout, institutional support in the
Fed, the Bundesbank, and other central banks. Monetarism is credited for the monetary
policy success of the sharp disination of the early 80s in the US, the UK, and continental
Europe. Since the 2000s, no PhD in monetary economics hired in a Central Bank research
department refers to Friedmans monetarism. In Taylor (2001) interview with Friedman,
the o¢ cial obituary notice is short: "the estimate of the velocity of money is not stable"
(De Vroey (2016)). A Taylor rule on the federal funds rate replaced Friedmans monetary
rules. In the 80s, monetarists would have ironically grinned at forecasts (nobody made) of
the death of such a powerful theory in the 90s. A resurrection of monetarism in the near
future is unlikely. Quantitative easing seemingly led to negligible increases of ination
and of real output in Japan, US, UK, and the Euro-area in recent years.
2. Real business cycles
Kydland and Prescotts (1982) real business cycle (RBC) theory claimed monetary
policy ine¤ectiveness while rejecting econometrics. It was referred to as « dark ages
» by John Taylor. It was American-based with two future Nobel-prize winners. A
bureaucratic labour market of policy makers may have killed RBC theory. The Fed and
later the ECB and other central banks have a large market share of jobs for PhDs in
monetary macroeconomics. It was not sustainable in the medium run to hire sta¤ and
consultants only able to produce variations of RBC denying any use of central banks.
3. Ad hoc rational expectations or Keynesian models not based on optimal
savings
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A large market share of macroeconomic models in the 80s were Keynesian or rational
expectations models (for example, the over-shooting of exchange rate) not based on op-
timal savings. In the 90s, optimal savings based on the intertemporal substitution e¤ect
of the interest rate on consumption, with innite (Ramsey) or nite horizon in overlap-
ping generation models, turned to be of compulsory use in mainstream macroeconomic
models. This was fostered by theories of endogenous growth, of the open macroeconomy,
and of real business cycles. Their obituary notice mentions: either they were static or
they lacked micro-economic foundations.
4. Disequilibrium macroeconomics assuming quantity rationing on goods
and labor market
As a subset of the models of section 3, this theory assumed price rigidity with ex-
cess supply or excess demand using static models and econometrics. It was French and
Belgium-based without a Nobel prize awarded. The obituary notice mentions: it did not
nd allies among US-based macroeconomists. Researchers and their PhDs shifted to en-
dogenous growth theory or overlapping generation (OLG) models or macro-econometrics
or real business cycles or microeconomics or retired.
Graduate-level macroeconomic theories which emerged in the 70s and ourished and
prospered in the 80s faced accelerated depreciation in the 90s. By contrast, a few econo-
mists emphasized the surprising resilience of the 40s IS-LM model in undergraduate
macroeconomic textbooks to understand economic policy during the 2007. . . economic
crisis.
The explanation for this lack of cumulative knowledge is puzzling. Are modern macro-
economic theories only driven by creative destructions, by new theories, doomed to be
destructed later on? As asset price bubbles, are they only driven by fads and fashions
for a given generation of macroeconomists with a time-period of 25 years?
2.2 The new-Keynesian DSGE theory
Is the new-Keynesian DSGE theory the new paradigm of a scientic revolution? The new-
Keynesian model is a bargain between leaders of opinions in the real business cycle group
and in the new-Keynesian group between 1992 to 1997, at the expense of Friedmans
monetarism. It is a combination of ve existing elements:
(1) Kydland and Prescotts (1982) exogenous auto-regressive forcing variable, adding
as many exogenous serially correlated forcing variables as time-series used in the estima-
tion of new-Keynesian DSGE models.
(2) Calvos (1983) staggered price-setting, leading to the new-Keynesian Phillips
curve, where the expectation of future ination is negatively correlated to an increase
of the current output gap, as opposed to the accelerationist Phillips curve.
(3) Ramseys (1928) optimal saving, where the future consumption is expected to
increase following a rise of the real interest rate. The monetary policy transmission
mechanism is based on this intertemporal substitution e¤ect of the interest rate instead
of the cost of capital.
(4) A Taylor (1993) rule: the monetary policy interest rate responds to ination
deviation from its target and to the output gap. Monetary aggregates are not necessary
to explain monetary policy.
(5) Blanchard and Kahns (1980) unique solution for dynamical systems, with the ad
hoc assumption of the policy instrument (interest rate) and the policy targets (ination
and output gap) to be simultaneously forward-looking variables.
5
The core of the bargain was on agreeing to assume simultaneously assumptions (1)
and (2):
On the real business cycle side, King agreed to include assumption (2) ad hoc price
rigidity for a proportion of rms over time (Calvos (1983) price setting), which the Real
Business Cycles group had doctrinally refused to assume for ten to fteen years before.
On the new-Keynesian side, Rotemberg, Woodford, and Gali agreed to include as-
sumption (1) ad hoc auto-regressive and possibly negative productivity shocks (Kydland
and Prescott (1982)), which the new-Keynesian group had doctrinally refused to assume
for the ten to fteen years before.
On these ve compulsory elements are added a large number of variations (credit
frictions, search on the labor market, open economies,...), which denes the eld of new-
Keynesian DSGE models. Because there is a large number of variations, some consider
this approach as a paradigm. But is it a scientic methodological revolution equivalent
to the Keynesian invention of macroeconomics? Instead of a revolutionary paradigm,
it may be a patchwork of already existing elements that do not go together well, if the
target is to explain the relationship between macroeconomic policy and macroeconomic
variables and to advise policymakers.
As an example of elements that do not go together well, the combination of (4) and
(5) with the ad hoc assumption of the policy instrument and the policy target to be
simultaneously forward-looking variables led to the unbelievable mechanism of a positive-
feedback policy rule in order to stabilize ination. "In new-Keynesian models, higher
ination leads the Fed to set interest rates in a way that produces even higher future
ination. For only one value of ination today will ination fail to explode." (Cochrane
(2011)).
This ad hoc positive-feedback policy rule is the opposite of the negative-feedback
mechanism of the two original papers. Taylors rule (1993) is a negative-feedback rule
leaning against ination spirals assuming that ination is backward-looking (Cochrane
(2011)). Blanchard and Kahns (1980) condition for a unique solution (determinacy) is
a copy and paste of the unique solution of the optimal control linear-quadratic regulator
(Vaughan (1970)) for optimal negative-feedback rules of ad hoc linear rational expecta-
tions linear systems. Blanchard and Kahn (1980) rename "costate" variables (policy
instruments) of an Hamiltonian system in Vaughan (1970) "forward-looking" variables of
an ad hoc linear system, and "state" variables (policy targets) of an Hamiltonian system
"backward-looking" variables.
The new-Keynesian DSGE theory took over the four theories mentioned above. It
contradicts characteristic features of each of the above theories, while picking in some
cases some of their assumptions:
Monetarism: The new-Keynesian DSGE theory claims that monetary policy mat-
ters but not monetary aggregates. For the monetary policy transmission channel, it
substituted a dynamic version of the quantitative theory of money (monetary aggregates
have an e¤ect on future output and prices) by the new-Keynesian Phillips curve. For
the monetary policy rule, it substituted any type of monetary rule by the Taylor rule,
using the interest rate as a policy instrument responding to the output gap and to the
deviation of ination from its target.
Real business cycles: The new-Keynesian DSGE theory assumes staggered price-
setting and price rigidity. It states that monetary policy matters. It expands the number
of auto-regressive shocks to be equal to the number of forward variables (instead of using
only one measured time series of the productivity supply shocks). It claims some of the
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shocks to be demand shocks. It uses econometric (Bayesian) estimation of some of the
parameters instead of calibrating all parameters.
Ad hoc macroeconomic models without optimal savings: The new-Keynesian
DSGE theory assumes that savings behavior is derived from Ramsey intertemporal op-
timization. In downturns, the poorer the representative household is and the lower its
relative uctuation aversion, the larger are his savings in order to get back to its equi-
librium stock of wealth. In booms, the richer the representative household is and the
lower its relative uctuation aversion, the lower are his savings in order to get back to its
equilibrium stock of wealth.
Disequilibrium macroeconomics: The new-Keynesian DSGE theory does not as-
sume that there is disequilibrium in quantities (neither excess demand nor excess supply)
on the goods and the labor market, although it includes Calvos (1983) assumption that
a proportion of rms exogenously face price rigidities in each period.
The new-Keynesian model is a bargain on two elementary theoretical assumptions
between leaders of opinions in theoretical macroeconomics around 1997. This new model
had no formal and mathematical di¢ culty, adding together components already available
in the economic literature.
Most macroeconomists abandoned their former "school of thought" of the 80s. They
were versatile and recycled themselves quickly to a new one. In despair of cumulative
science, a few positivists may appeal to a nostalgia narrative: "There may remain a avor
of the spirit of 80s theory where we could decipher a far-fetched analogy, inheritance,
inuence in the new-Keynesian DSGE theory, with at least the reference to two common
very broad stylized facts, price rigidity and monetary policy."
2.3 Facts that do not go away?
In order to explain the above creative destruction, Blanchards arguments of "facts that
do not go away" is challenged by a timing issue. The empirical evidence of monetary
policy e¤ectiveness and price stickiness was available at least in 1982, and not only in
1997. "Facts that do not go away" was not su¢ cient to change the point of view of
macroeconomists in the 80s.
(1) Monetary policy is e¤ective. Statistics on ination, federal funds rate, monetary
aggregates, output, and unemployment during Volckers disinationary policy 1980-1982
were available and mentioned in the economic policy debates.
(2) The stylized fact of staggered price rigidity was also known in the 70s and 80s. Go
to a supermarket and check whether the prices of your favorite consumer goods change
every week, even in the time of two digit ination.
(3) The stylized fact that the econometric estimate of the velocity of money is not
constant did not stop monetarism in the 70s and 80s.
(4) The stylized facts that do not go away of housing price bubbles and of nancial
crisis (Reinhard and Rogo¤ (2010)) were set aside of the consensus of the new-Keynesian
DSGE synthesis before 2008.
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3 Macroeconomic Theory and Tests
3.1 A question of purpose and design
Either macroeconomic theory need not, cannot, and should not be tested (1) or macro-
economic theory need, can, and should be tested (2).
(1) Microeconomic, macroeconomic, and general equilibrium economic theories are
only deductive and normative theories, seeking the best allocations of resources, as a
branch of applied mathematics. Deductive theories need not, cannot, and should not be
tested. For nearly two centuries, many economists, including Marshall, Walras, Keynes,
Debreu, and Austrian economists among others, did not design their theories in order to
test them. Spanos (2009) describes this pre-eminence of theory approach.
(2) Economic theory is designed to face the challenge of statistical tests. It is then
facing induction and shifts to positive economics. If an economist intends to test his
theory, he needs to design it in such a way that parameters are identied for tests with
an available data set. If at least two distinct sets of parameters of a theory predicts
exactly the same observations ("observational equivalence"), there is an identication
problem for testing the theory. This problem requires an additional theory which adds
an identication restriction. The researcher also implicitly accepts that his theory may
be rejected by the data and that theory should be modied accordingly.
These two views corresponded to a division of labor which prevailed until the 90s
between macroeconomic theorists versus macro-econometricians, with each group being
unable to master the distinct and highly specialized skills of the other group.
3.2 Controversies and tests of macroeconomic theory
Can observations of "nature" settle the macroeconomic controversies, as in other elds
of science? After Latours (1988) "science in the making" controversies, "nature" may
nally settle the controversy where knowledge accumulates into Latours (1988) "ready-
made science" in the store of no-longer controversial "scientic facts".
In Kruegers (2003, p.189) interview, Malinvaud mentions: "It was easy to study
problems in microeconomic theory, which were well dened, and where a brain educated in
mathematics could bring contributions. But macroeconomics was a more di¢ cult domain
to conduct research, because the questions were so involved and had many aspects. Lets
say we were not on a clean land." Econometrics can be viewed as a branch of applied
statistics. Microeconomics can be viewed as a branch of applied mathematics, dealing
with economic choices based on applied optimization under constraints. Both of them
are "well-dened" and likely to follow a cumulative path for knowledge similar to the
eld of applied mathematics.
Firstly, macroeconomic theory with its links to macroeconomic policy and politics,
political economy, the choice of the design of market institutions, ideology and ideas, the
vested interests of social groups, structural changes brought by technical innovations, by
history and by the geopolitics of power and conicts against nations is prone, not only to
country-period specic knowledge, but also to unstable and non-cumulative knowledge
and potentially never-ending controversies.
Secondly, it is more di¢ cult to test macroeconomic theory than microeconomic theory
for the following reasons: endogeneity, small samples and confounding and competing
causal factors and explanatory variables, unit roots, and structural change.
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(1) All macroeconomic variables are endogenous (except geography and rainfall or
information far remote in the past). Testing macroeconomic theory faces the lack of
identication, arbitrary identication restrictions, and weak identication using weak
instrumental variables. Macroeconomic monetary and scal policy and their endogeneity
and interactions with expectations complicate the estimations of macroeconomic policy
e¤ects.
(2) Small samples and population. When not pooling time-series cross-countries,
macroeconomics does not benet from large samples in microeconomic data. Structural
change may limit the relevant time-dimension of time-series. Natural experiments be-
tween comparable countries in order to evaluate causality with the e¤ect of a policy
treatment are frequent but the sample of observations per country is very small. Statis-
tical inference is therefore limited. One may compare North versus South Korea, East
versus West Germany, Haiti versus St Domingue, but the number of observations is equal
to two.
(3) Natural experiments are not done in isolation: there are always several confounding
e¤ects. The determinants of economic growth may go up to fty factors, with up to a
dozen of di¤erent measures of each of the factors (up to 500 explanatory variables). A
government budget cut appears at the same time as a GDP expansion, because exports
increased in the short run due to a devaluation of the currency at the same time (for
expansionary austerity in Nordic countries in the 80s). In Ireland in the 1990s, labour
market reform occurs at the same time as foreign direct investment low-tax incentives
and European Union subsidies.
(4) Macroeconomic time-series may have large auto-correlation parameters close to
one ("unit-root"). This may lead to spurious regressions. Those spurious regressions can
be published on the ground that the statistical power of unit-root tests is small for small
samples, such as forty years of quarterly data.
(5) The correlations between macroeconomic time-series are not stable for periods
longer than 10 to 20 years (40 to 80 quarterly observations). This is caused by structural
changes such as breaks in the growth of productivity and technical change, changes of
exchange rate regimes, changes of regulations on capital ows and cross-border banking
and nance (nancial globalization and its reversal), changes of political preferences for
macroeconomic policies along with the learning process of structural changes in macroeco-
nomic policy transmission mechanisms, changes on trade agreements and current account
imbalances, demographic transition, wars, increases of inequalities...
3.3 Pressure from Stata-evidence revolution
The prestige of "pure" macroeconomic theory has been challenged in the 2000s, because of
a massive expansion of the data-rst approach in macroeconomics and microeconomics.
Starting in the mid-90s, the instant and free access of economic data on the internet
(without the time-consuming issue of typing them), the ease of use of statistical software
(surprisingly Stata), the increased computational capacities of the personal computers
created a crowd of young applied econometricians. All graduate students in economics
are able to obtain quickly statistical results which were primarily the production of near-
genius Nobel-prize level researchers in the 30s-60s and then of engineer-like nerds using
mainframe computers in the 70s-80s. In the 90s-2000s, this lead to a loss of market
share of published articles in pure macroeconomic theory vis-à-vis applied or theory-
with-estimation papers.
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Empirical work and VAR are also t for academic and central banks research de-
partment careers, as much as new-Keynesian DSGE theory. A p-value below 5% leads
to statistical signicance is easy to reach with large sample and multiple testing. It does
not require judgment nor tacit knowledge as a criterion for publishing a research paper
(Wasserstein and Lazar (2016)). Colanders (2009) argument of "social replication" ex-
planation for the success of DSGE models is not so obvious. It is only in central bank
research departments and academia that both DSGE models and VAR models are used.
In private banking sector research, new-Keynesian DSGE models are not used, whereas
VAR are used for forecasting.
Probably half of the data-rst published papers are related to a "simple" theory,
seeking the statistical signicance of the parameter between two variables or of impulses
responses of vector auto-regressive models. CVAR is not a macroeconomic theory. It
is a statistical method to test existing alternative macroeconomic theories against each
other. There remains a need for CVAR "to bridge the gap between theory and data by
developing structural models beyond the ones associated with data-induced restrictions"
(Spanos (2009), p.11). Inventing these theories may be grounded on cost-benet analysis
(microeconomic foundations), on rule based behavior (agent-based models) or any other
criteria di¤erent than only tting CVAR. CVAR did not eradicated DSGE models nor
conversely. But it added pressure on new-Keynesian DSGE modelers to nd ways to
claim their new-Keynesian DSGE models were as good at forecasting as CVAR.
3.4 Greshams law of the theory of positive macroeconomics
An extravagant demand pushed toward normative theory to be identical to positive the-
ory, not only in order to estimate the relations between macroeconomic variables as
functions of structural parameters, but also in order that normative theory appears as
a top-performing tool for short run forecasting. This put great stress upon data sets.
Under such a pressure for quick and dirty empirical justication of new-Keynesian DSGE
macroeconomic theory, an alternative empirical approach spread. It bargains between
normative and positive economics, on the behalf of the requirement that the data and
the world should normatively behave according to the theory but reach statistical sig-
nicance for t-tests. The normative theory turns out to be positive economics, with a
loose connection with the data, exploiting the pitfalls of the lack of identication, of weak
identication and the numerous weaknesses of statistical data, methods and tests.
The most famous kick-o¤ of this approach has been Kydland and Prescotts (1982)
"Real Business Cycles". Calibration was invented because it was expected that econo-
metric tests would reject the model. Calibration was another way to "adjust" with data
and use statistics without econometrics. Their approach neatly avoided identifying and
testing its structural parameters.
It is not necessary to follow such a radical approach against econometrics. The advan-
tage of lack of identication or weak identication is that a researcher does not receive a
signal from a statistical software when there is a parameter identication problem while
the statistical signicance of the parameters (using the t-test) may be obtained. A weakly
and/or not identied theory is likely to be successful, because one is more likely to nd
statistical signicance for the desired values of parameters (any value may actually be
estimated in some cases). One nd allies for a new theory if many others can nd seem-
ingly successful statistical signicance tests using variations of your theory. This leads to
Greshams law for preferring non-identied and weakly identied theories.
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Treating openly identication issues leads to modest and disappointing results. It
may lead to the empirical rejection of new-Keynesian DSGE theory. It is rewarding
for the scientic careers of theory-rst macroeconomists to escape a detailed treatment
of identication issues. While pretending empirical evidence, this strategy maintains
theory-rst tradition alive, doing business as usual, despite the growing crowd of applied
economists, with these features:
(1) Claim the empirical evidence of some of the propositions derived from the axioms.
The evidence is grounded on a biased use of the information in the data.
(2) Weight on deductive theory instead of inductive.
(3) Weight on normative as if positive.
(4) Coordinate on the axioms of the deductive theory colluding with a network of
allies and involve a network of stakeholders, such as central bank research departments.
(5) Defend the axioms of the deductive theory using arguments of authority and
hierarchy, ideology, political police rhetorics, in order to force dissenters out of the eld
of mainstream macroeconomics (Romer (2016)).
3.5 Opacity and "mathiness"
This normative-positive empirical approach may go hand in hand with Romers (2015)
"mathiness" blurring the interpretation and the understanding of the economic theory.
We may dene mathiness as ambiguous literary discourse, analogies and interpretation
of formal mathematical models, with a narrative which describes something else or the
opposite of the working of the formal mathematical model, to get it published, to sell the
paper in broadening its contribution and its empirical evidence, to convince and to nd
new allies.
"Mathiness" in new-Keynesian DSGE modelling is related to technological progress:
the development of the Dynare software in the 2000s. While easing access to DSGE
simulations and Bayesian econometrics to new PhD students, many of this DSGE-born
generation of macroeconomists did not learn the expertise and the modelling skills of
small scale consistent macroeconomic models and the understanding of their mathemat-
ical solutions. This widened the gap between their literary fairy-tale narrative on the
mechanisms underlying the impulse response functions of their DSGE models and their
e¤ective, obscure and messy mechanisms. These mechanism are related to several distor-
tions with respect to perfect competition equilibrium, while omitting from time to time
stock-ow accounting equations, assuming variables such as the capital stock are not ob-
servable. "It is often extremely hard to understand what a particular distortion does on
its own and then how it interacts with other distortions in the model." (Blanchard (2016),
p.3).
3.6 Drivers of destruction
Will the future of the new-Keynesian DSGE theory in twenty years be di¤erent from
theories of the 80s? Exogenous and endogenous factors may drive creative destruction.
(1) The demand for empirical validation and replication is likely to rise with more
and more big data access. The combination of the core ve compulsory assumptions of
New-Keynesian DSGE theory is too fragile to meet this demand. The monetary policy
transmission mechanism based on the quantitative theory with a constant velocity of
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money was found to be a fragile theory with respect to data. Positive-feedback Tay-
lor rules and the monetary policy transmission mechanism based on the new-Keynesian
Phillips curve and the intertemporal substitution e¤ect of the interest rate is at least
as fragile as monetarism with respect to data. More and more of the weaknesses of its
empirical validations will be detailed and repeated in referee reports.
(2) The boredom of repeating variations of useless and opaque results, with more and
more knowledge on their empirical weakness hurts new generations. New generations
prefer to explore new theories with not yet known empirical weaknesses with even more
opaque identication issues, which is promising for agent-based models.
(3) Structural change in modern economies will lead to new questions. The answers of
more and more opaque DSGE simulations adding more and more equations will be more
and more expected to be disappointing. It is already the case with macro-prudential
DSGE models.
(4) The increases of computational power of computers and big data access will allow
to invent and use new statistical and simulations tools.
(5) The strength of authority and clique arguments supporting new-Keynesian DSGE
theory weakens due to aging, retirements, decreasing returns to scale, decreasing returns
to scope, decreasing support in academia and Central Banks. Political police rhetorical
arguments enforcing threats that there is no job o¤er in academia or in central banks for
alternative macroeconomic theory will no longer be credible. Recurrent dissenting papers
by authorities in the eld of mainstream macroeconomics (the latest ones by Blanchard
(2016) and by Romer (2016)) will take over. Nobel-prize-awards will be a signal that it
is time to nail the co¢ n of this fragile macroeconomic theory, after it provided work and
careers to many researchers.
Political police rhetorics denying controversies, claiming forced consensus, dismissing
dissenters to push them out of macroeconomic theory signals the lack of robust empirical
validations of macroeconomic theory. These political police rhetorics lack credibility,
because the ones claiming now a forced consensus will jump on to the next train of the
future mainstream new way of writing macroeconomic theory.
A new type of dynamic stochastic macroeconomic model, with or without equilibrium,
will emerge. At the beginning, it has to be rhetorically presented as a new consensus,
upgrading new-Keynesian DSGE theory, in order to nd allies during the transition. But
it will not be based on the combination of the ve core new-Keynesian DSGE assumptions.
Thousands of new-Keynesian DSGE papers will belong to the history of dead economic
theories. There is no guarantee, however, that the new theory will t data and facts
better.
4 Macroeconomic Theories with Too Many Struc-
tural Parameters.
4.1 A useful normative theory can be a useless positive theory
This rst example of observational equivalence and an identication problem is obtained
when the prediction of the theory implies a linear relation between two variables (yt; xt)
with a number of reduced-form parameters  (in this case, equal to one) lower than the
number of structural parameters of this theory. In the example below, the theory predicts
that the sum of two structural parameters denoted (a; b) is equal to :
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yt = xt + "t+1 where  = a+ b and "t is i.i.d. N
 
0; 2"

:
For a Marshallian normative theory point of view, this theory is useful, because one
can explain comparative statics to undergraduate students in the economics tripos in
Cambridge. A change of parameter a ceteris paribus (with b unchanged) and conversely
has a di¤erent e¤ect of y on x. The theory may satisfy useful criteria and principles from
a normative point of view, such as microeconomic foundations or rational expectations.
From a Koopmans or Cowles Commission positive economics point of view, this theory
is useless, because it is impossible to distinguish using data the e¤ect of a (ceteris paribus)
from the e¤ect of b. It is also impossible to distinguish this theory from an innite set
of alternative "observationally equivalent" theories where the reduced-form parameter 
is any function of any nite or innite number of structural parameters. This is such an
obvious case of an useless under-identied model with too many structural parameters
with respect to the number of reduced form parameters, that it is never mentioned in
econometrics textbooks.
There is observational equivalence for the reduced-form parameter function of two
structural parameters when at least two distinct sets of values of structural parameters
(a; b) provide the same prediction:
b = 1) a = b   b = 1  b:
For an estimated value of the reduced-form parameter b = 1; there are at least two
sets of values, for example b = 0 and a = 1 or b = 1 and a = 0. In this particular
case, there is an innity of pairs of structural parameters (a; b) such that a + b = b
that predicts the same observations. To estimate one of the two structural parameters
(a; b), the researcher needs an additional theory justifying an additional identication
restriction, such as b = 2. Then, he can estimate the other parameter: ba = b   2.
A criterion to select among positive theories mentioned in Aristotles physics, twenty
ve centuries ago, later mentioned by Aquinas in 13th century and then by Ockham in
14th century (Ockhams razor) is as follows: among all theories with exactly the same
predictions, the simplest theory with the lowest number of parameters has to be chosen.
A useful normative theory can be a useless positive theory with too many parameters.
The divergence between normative versus positive knowledge facing Ockhams razor
is an old issue, much broader than macroeconomic theory. For "positive" science, God is
an unnecessary hypothesis for the theory of celestial mechanics, according to Laplaces
answer to Napoleon and for Darwins theory of evolution. Aquinas (1920, part 1, Q.2)
second objection on the existence of God is : "Further, it is superuous to suppose that
what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems
that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing
God did not exist.". But this does not imply that God does not exist. God is a necessary
assumption for "normative" or teleological theology (van Inwagen (2005), Glass (2016)).
To have a chance for this normative theory to be empirically useful as a positive theory,
one needs to provide additional theory in order to know when identication restrictions
are valid on available observations. In this example, an additional theory and information
helps us to nd some observations of an available data set where a structural parameter
a is held constant while another structural parameter b is not constant (this subset of
observations allows to estimate bb) and conversely (the alternative subset of observations
allows to estimate ba).
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The design of a positive theory has to go hand in hand with the precise design of the
identication of its parameters in its empirical test, taking into account the availability
of data. But academia may reward the quick and dirty "imprecise" positive validation of
a fascinating normative theory.
4.2 Testing optimal growth and convergence
Testing the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans optimal-growth model has been done in cross-country
convergence regressions in the 1990s. The growth of gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita is regressed on an initial level of GDP/head. A meta-analysis found the estimated
parameter on average around b = 2% for the period 1960-2000 (Abreu et al. (2005)).
For the closed-economymodel with a constant savings rate (Solow-Swan), the reduced-
form convergence parameter  depends on four structural parameters: the elasticity of
capital in the production function , the growth rate of labour n, the growth rate of
labour-augmenting technical change x, and the depreciation rate of capital  (Barro and
Sala-I-Martin (2004), p.112)):
 (; x; n; ) = (1  ) (n+ x+ ) constant savings rate (Solow model). (1)
For the optimal-growth closed-economymodel (Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans), the reduced-
form convergence parameter  depends on six structural parameters: the same four
technological parameters as in the Solow-Swan model and two utility parameters of the
representative generations of consumers. Utility and preferences of generations of the
representative consumer include the discount rate over generations  and the relative
uctuation aversion parameter  (Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004), p.111):
 ((; x; n; ) ; (; ))
=
1
2

2 + 4 (1  )

+  + x


+  + x


  (n+ x+ )

  
2
(2)
 =   n  (1  )x > 0:
In the case when ++x

=  (n+ x+ ), the optimal-growth convergence parameter
is identical to the constant savings-rate convergence parameter (Barro and Sala-I-Martin
p.109).
The discount rate over generations of consumers (), can be set to zero. This identi-
cation restriction is assumed by Ramsey (1928) who argues against discounting future
generations on an ethical principle of equality among generations. The growth rate of
the population n can be easily computed. The growth rate of labour-augmenting techni-
cal change x could be measured estimating a production function, although the measure
of the stock of any type of capital (physical, human, and so on) depends on uncertain
judgments on the depreciation of the variety of capital goods .
Two structural parameters measure the curvature of the production function  and
the curvature of the utility function . They measure the degree of concavity or the extent
to which the production and utility function di¤er from a linear function. The rst one
() is the return to scale of any kind of capital that can be accumulated without instant
depreciation. When the returns to scale tend to one, convergence is extremely slow. The
second one () is the relative aversion of uctuations of consumption (the inverse of the
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intertemporal elasticity of substitution). When the relative aversion to uctuations tends
to innity, convergence is extremely slow.
The design of the convergence test does not allow to distinguish utility curvature 
from production curvature . There is observational equivalence for a given convergence
parameter b = 2%: it may correspond to large returns to capital  with a low relative
uctuation aversion  and conversely. Because of under-identication with too many
structural parameters, the convergence hypothesis test cannot test the exogenous savings
rate (Solow growth model) versus endogenous savings (Ramsey, Cass, Koopmans optimal
growth model).
The key achievement of normative optimal growth theory (utility characteristics mat-
ter) is forgotten in the positive convergence hypothesis empirical literature, which is
nonetheless described in textbook to be the closest empirical test of neoclassical growth
theory (Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004), p.466). The contribution of Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans-Malinvaud optimal growth theory is to state that utility matters due to prefer-
ences for smoothing consumption over time and generations. Utility matters in normative
theory but not in the positive convergence hypothesis test nor in growth accounting.
4.3 Keynesian VAR versus new-Keynesian DSGE theory of in-
ation persistence
The structural or cointegrated VAR data-rst approach (Juselius (2010), Spanos (2013),
Colander (2009)) has been perceived as a challenge to proponents of the new-Keynesian
DSGE theory. We present the simplest way to understand how new-Keynesian DSGE
theory seemingly answered successfully to this challenge. New-Keynesian DSGE theory
is able to claim that the accuracy of its forecasts can be at least equivalent to the one of
VAR (Smets and Wouters (2007), Smets, Wouters and Linder (2016)).
We demonstrate that a Keynesian VAR and new-Keynesian theories of ination-
persistence are observationally equivalent. But the new-Keynesian theory includes at
least one more structural parameter which cannot be identied than Keynesian VAR the-
ory. As there is observational equivalence between these two theories, Ockhams razor
selects the Keynesian VAR theory which has the lowest number of parameters.
Including forcing variables that are serially correlated and non-observable leads to
a parameter identication problem. This identication issue helps to understand more
precisely Romers (2016) critique on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models.
The Keynesian VAR theory of ination persistence assumes backward-looking adap-
tive expectations so that ination t is an auto-regressive process of order 1 (AR(1)) with
an auto-correlation parameter  and with a disturbance "t which is not auto-correlated
over time ( = 0):
t+1 = t + "t+1 where 0 <  < 1, where "t is i.i.d. N
 
0; 2

, 0 given
) Ett+1 = t;
where "t are zero-mean, normally, independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
additive disturbances. An AR(1) is indeed a univariate VAR, where the vector is a scalar
including only one time-series. The initial value of predetermined ination 0 is given.
Ination expectations are backward-looking adaptive: Ett+1 = t.
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The new-Keynesian theory of ination persistence is given by the new-Keynesian
Phillips curve (Gali (2015)). For simplicity, assume that the output gap does not deviate
from zero, and assume the identication restriction that the Taylor policy rule parameter
measuring the response of the policy instrument (interest rate or the output gap) to the
deviation of the policy target (ination) is zero. Ination is assumed to be forward-
looking, without an initial condition for ination, with potentially exploding dynamics
with a growth factor 1

> 1 driven by ination expectations Ett+1. Ination also depends
on a backward-looking auto-regressive () "cost-push" forcing variable, with a given initial
value u0 :
Ett+1 =
1

t + ut where 0 <  < 1; 0 unknown and endogenous
ut+1 = ut + "t+1 where 0 <  < 1, u0 given
Blanchard and Kahns (1980) unique solution for rational expectations models is such
that ination is anchored to be exactly collinear with the non-observable shock:
t+1 = Nut+1 = Nut +N"t+1 = Nt=N +N"t+1 = t +N"t+1
) Ett+1 = t; with N = 1
  1

< 0; where 0 = Nu0
The proportional coe¢ cient N is the slope of the eigenvectors of the stable eigenvalue
() of the saddle-point equilibrium of ination and the cost-push shock. The regression
t = Nut is predicted to be exact, with a coe¢ cient of determination equal to 1 and with
a negative slope (N < 0). Economic agents anchor the initial value of ination on the
initial value of the cost-push shock only if they can observe the cost-push shock.
But when testing the new-Keynesian theory, the cost-push forcing variable time-series
is assumed not to be measured (observable) for the econometrician (e.g. Smets and
Wouters (2007)). This is a major di¤erence from the measured auto-regressive Solow
residual of the aggregate production function used in real business cycles (Kydland and
Prescott (1982)). Hence, the econometrician cannot run the simple regression of ination
on the cost-push shock (t = Nut). He cannot estimate N nor the explosive parame-
ter 1= created by ination expectations. The econometrician cannot di¤erentiate the
Keynesian residuals "t+1 from the new-Keynesian residuals multiplied by N : N"t+1 using
the estimate of the standard error of the residuals of the regression of ination on lagged
ination. He cannot use identication condition from the variance of residuals.
Ination 0 is given in the Keynesian theory. In the new-Keynesian theory, the ob-
served initial value of ination is obtained as an anchor on a cost-push variable 0 = Nu0
where the econometrician is unable to observe u0. These two models for the initial value of
ination are observationally equivalent due to the lack of knowledge of the econometrician
of u0.
Table 1 sums up which variable is observed and which auto-correlation parameter can
be estimated.
Table 1: The new-Keynesian Synthesis
Observed Not observed
Variable Ination Cost-push forcing variable
Auto-regressive parameter Cost-push shock: 0 <  < 1 Ination: 1= > 1
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In the new-Keynesian theory, the unobserved auto-correlated shock is assumed in
order to t the observed auto-correlation of ination time-series. Keynesian backward-
looking ination and new-Keynesian forward-looking ination are then observationally
equivalent. By assuming a non-observable exogenous serially correlated forcing variable,
the new-Keynesian theory of ination persistence achieves that it cannot be tested against
the Keynesian VAR theory of ination persistence.
t+1 = t + "t+1 observationally equivalent to t+1 = t +N"t+1;
where 0 <  < 1, 0 <  < 1 and N cannot be estimated.
Using Hoovers (2015, p.3521) terminology on this case, the new-Keynesian theory
assumes an "ontologically" independent serially correlated latent forcing variable. But if
the Keynesian theory is an apt articulation of the causal structure, the auto-correlation
 of the cost-push shock ut is simply an artifact of the representation.
However, Hoover uses a distinct example where the number of identied parameters
(equal to 3) is the same in the two representations which are observationally equiva-
lent while being "ontologically" di¤erent. In sharp contrast with Hoovers example, the
Keynesian theory has a smaller number of parameters than the new-Keynesian theory,
which includes the explosive growth rate of ination expectations 1= that can never be
estimated. Ockhams razor argument of parsimony is that the Keynesian theory with
the lower number of parameters predicting exactly the same observations than the new-
Keynesian theory should be selected. Adding an innity of auto-regressive latent variables
may be useful for normative theory and, at the same time, useless for positive theory.
The new-Keynesian DSGE theory of ination persistence ismore complicated than the
Keynesian theory for another reason. The negative relationship between the slope of the
stable eigenvector N determining ination and the rate of growth of ination ctitious
expectations 1= is the opposite of the economic intuition that ination expectations
dynamics are positively correlated with ination dynamics. The larger the explosive
growth rate of ctitious expectations (the larger 1=), the lower is ination, because the
slope of the eigenvectors N decreases. An innitely explosive growth rate of ination
ctitious expectations process (1= tends to innity) leads to zero ination.
If ever the ination expectations ctitious dynamics is not explosive: 0 < 1= < 1,
the new-Keynesian theory predicts the indeterminacy of the initial condition of ination.
In the particular case where the ination expectations are not explosive and exactly equal
to the auto-correlation of the non-observable shock (0 < 1= =  < 1), ination tends
to innity, because the slope of the eigenvector N tends to innity. By contrast, in
this case 0 < 1= =  < 1, there is no longer the identication issue raised by Fève,
Matheron, Poilly (2007) for the auto-regressive model with auto-regressive residuals and
predetermined (backward-looking) ination:
t+1 = t + ut+1 where 0 <  < 1, and
ut+1 = ut + "t+1 where "t is i.i.d. Normal
 
0; 2

, 0 and u0 given:
Smets and Wouters (2007) expand the above identication issue including six other
time series besides ination. These seven time-series are all related to seven auto-
regressive exogenous forcing variables. Four exogenous auto-regressive parameters of
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these forcing variables have auto-correlation coe¢ cients estimated to be close to unit
roots. This implies a very high goodness of t of the estimation (a coe¢ cient of determi-
nation R2 close to one). The contribution of other parameters and other variables in the
model is likely to explain a very small share of the remaining unexplained variance. They
may over-t the data while picking a few specic observations. One may wonder whether
the empirical validation of their DSGE model is close to be observationally equivalent
to the auto-correlation coe¢ cients of seven macroeconomic time-series. This allows the
authors to claim an overwhelming goodness of t of their new-Keynesian DSGE model.
Normative DSGE theory turns to be a top-performing theory for short run forecasting.
Once the cost-push shock is measured by an economic time-series, instead of being
computed by the auto-correlation of residuals of the ination equation, the identication
issue vanishes. One can test the new-Keynesian theory versus the Keynesian theory of
ination persistence. Firstly, test that the regression t = Nut should have a perfect t
R2 = 1 and, if not, the econometrician tests that its residuals are not auto-correlated.
Secondly, the econometrician performs tests of the statistical signicance of the hypothesis
of a negative sign of parameter N < 0 and the statistical signicance of the test of the null
hypothesis of an out-of-equilibrium exploding expectations parameter 1= > 1, having
estimated the auto-correlation parameter of ination  and its standard errors. These
demanding tests are likely to reject the new-Keynesian theory of ination persistence.
Under-identication is systematic in new-Keynesian DSGE models: several structural
parameters are related to a single reduced-form parameter in a non-linear way in new-
Keynesian DSGE theory. Consider that the output gap denoted xt is no longer equal to
zero in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve (Gali (2015)):
Ett+1 =
1

t   

xt + ut; where 0 <  < 1 and  > 0:
The estimated reduced-form parameter of the slope of the new-Keynesian Phillips
curve which relates ination to marginal cost or to the output gap (denoted ) depends on
four structural parameters: the representative household discount factor , the household
elasticity of substitution between each di¤erentiated goods ", the measure of decreasing
returns to scale of labor in the production functions of the rms , and the proportion
of rms who do not reset their price each period  (Gali (2015)):
 (; "; ; ) =
(1  ) (1  ) (1  )
 (1  + ") :
The new-Keynesian Phillips curve estimates , but not (; "; ; ). DSGE modelers
select values for ("; ; ) identical to ones of the rst DSGE paper which selected them.
This does not matter. These values match the estimate b for calibration and simulations
as well as an innity of other values of these parameters provide exactly the same  and
the same impulse response functions. The discount factor  appears in other equations,
so changing it may change the simulations. Finally, some researchers claim that the
proportion of rms who do not reset their price each period is endogenous and depends
on monetary policy rule parameters. The parameters  and  () face the Lucas critique.
The instability of the velocity of money for the monetary policy transmission mech-
anism was the argument to abandon monetarism. Mavroeidis et al. (2014) surveys the
instability of the estimates of , which is the key parameter of the monetary transmission
mechanism of the new-Keynesian DSGE theory. Will the new-Keynesian DSGE theory
of monetary policy avoid the fate of monetarism?
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5 Conclusion
Our point is not to promote data-rst against theory-rst, but an honest balance between
theory and data, as proposed by Spanos (2009). This leads to modest but robust em-
pirical results, once identication and weak identication issues are taken into account.
A theory which has not too many parameters has more chances to last than a theory
based on specic micro-foundations involving several non-testable structural parameters
and unexpected sign prediction, such as the new-Keynesian Phillips curve. Modest and
robust results are not demanded by top academic journals. They are not rewarding for
researchers.
As a consequence, testing between macroeconomic theories in order to settle con-
troversies has made very little robust progress. For this reason, new-Keynesian DSGE
theory is likely to face creative destruction as it happened to theories of the 80s.
A rst cost of the new-Keynesian DSGE theory is related to a bias in the allocation
of talent. A "forced consensus" emphasizes that there is no alternative on the job market
for current PhD candidates in macroeconomic theory than writing new-Keynesian DSGE
models. Skeptical PhD candidates with alternative ideas, in particular women, shift to
microeconomics or econometrics.
A second cost of the new-Keynesian DSGE theory is that, by its recurrent attempts
to force consensus while avoiding to consider identication issues in empirical tests, it
maintains macroeconomic theory as a science in the making, fostering endless controver-
sies. Macroeconomic theory does not accumulate at least a few modest and robust results
into ready-made science, in order to complement, if possible, the resilient undergraduate
IS-LM model.
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